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Abstract. The study of perceptual awareness in biology often relies upon the 
study of clinical conditions with either absent or abnormal awareness. In this ar-
ticle, we argue that the same approach may be fruitful in investigating artificial 
consciousness. To illustrate this, we draw upon recent examples in which disor-
ders of awareness have been induced in artificial systems. Specifically, we call 
upon the induction of hallucinatory phenomena, and upon visual neglect: a clas-
sical disorder of awareness that manifests as a disruption of the action-perception 
cycle. The key ideas we seek to emphasise from these are the presence of an 
internal model that generates perceptual content, and the capacity to actively en-
gage with the sensorium. 
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erative models 
1 Introduction 
Disorders of awareness have formed the basis for neuropsychological investigations 
into aspects of conscious experience in humans [1]. Part of the reason this approach has 
been so popular is that, while awareness is difficult to define, it is often easy to recog-
nise its absence. In this article, we suggest that an analogous approach could yield new 
insights in artificial consciousness research. To illustrate this, we describe two recent 
accounts of abnormal perception induced in (simulated) artificial systems. Crucially, 
these replicate phenomena observed in human disorders in which awareness is either 
impaired or augmented. First, we outline a computational account of visual hallucina-
tions that depends upon a failure of sensory systems to correct internally generated per-
ceptual content. Second, we discuss the importance of action in sampling the world, 
and the consequences of its failure in a synthetic version of visual neglect. 
To formalise the concepts above, it is useful to frame them in terms of active infer-
ence [2]. This is a way to describe perception and action that appeals to the minimisa-
tion of variational free energy, which depends upon a generative model that describes 
how a (living or artificial) system believes their sensory data are generated, and upon 
beliefs about the current state of the world [3, 4]. There are two ways in which free 
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energy may be minimised. The first is by optimising posterior beliefs such that they 
become more consistent with sensory data (i.e. inference). The second is by acting to 
change sensory data such that they conform to current beliefs. Combining the two, it 
becomes possible to infer future plans of action that will yield sensory data that mini-
mise expected free energy [5]. Intuitively, we can think of this as a scientific endeavour 
in which we use current sensory data to test hypotheses about their causes (minimising 
free energy), and use the resulting inferences to plan future experiments to gather more 
data (minimising expected free energy). 
 
2 Disorders of Awareness 
Hallucinations offer an interesting perspective on awareness, as they represent aware-
ness of fictitious perceptual content. Given the absence of supportive sensory data, this 
implies awareness can depend purely upon internally generated percepts [6]. To simu-
late this phenomenon, we constructed a generative model that included prior beliefs 
about abstract visual objects, and about the scene in which they were embedded [7]. By 
equipping the model with beliefs about the reliability of sensory data, we found that 
confidence in sensory data was down-weighted when data was inconsistent with prior 
beliefs. In some instances, this was sufficient to release perceptual inference from the 
constraints of these data, leading to hallucinatory phenomena (i.e. false positive infer-
ences) that preserved the internal consistency of the scene, consistent with many bio-
logical hallucinations [8]. This emphasises the importance of data in modulating per-
ceptual awareness, and the need to seek out informative, high quality, sensations. 
Pursuing the simile of the brain, or an artificial equivalent, as a scientist, we turn to 
planning as a process of experimental design, and what this means for evaluating the 
‘goodness’ of a plan. The best experiments are those that bring about a large change in 
beliefs. This has been formalised in the notion of information gain (or expected free 
energy), which has a long history in experimental design [9], and has been employed 
to understand salience in visual search [10]. The imperative to perform uncertainty-
resolving perceptual experiments may also be leveraged to account for a classic disor-
der of awareness; visual neglect. Neglect is a classic neuropsychological disorder of 
visual awareness in which one side of space is ignored [11] that can manifest as a pov-
erty of saccadic sampling (perceptual experimentation) in this hemifield [12]. If we are 
very confident in beliefs about variables associated with specific regions of space, ex-
periments (e.g. eye movements) that obtain data at these locations afford very little 
information gain. By setting prior beliefs about mappings from causes (fixations) to 
consequences (visual data) to be highly confident on one side of space, we were able to 
reproduce the behavioural phenomenology of visual neglect [13].  
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3 Conclusion 
In brief, we have summarised two instances in which disorders of perception have been 
replicated in synthetic systems. Each relies upon a failure to incorporate sensory data 
into perceptual inference; either due to a failure to use these data to constrain internally 
generated content, or a failure to acquire it in the first place. These synthetic disorders 
of awareness are highly consistent with philosophical perspectives on consciousness as 
a process of inference [14, 15]. Artificial consciousness, like its biological homologue, 
may benefit from the study of its disorders. While there may be many different ap-
proaches to develop conscious systems [16], a bidirectional engagement with their en-
vironment must be a key feature. Consequently, understanding the generation of spuri-
ous perceptual content, and the absence of awareness characteristic of neglect disorders, 
offers a new perspective on the requirements for synthetic conscious awareness in terms 
of the generative models that underwrite inferential procedures.  
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